US-Ireland Alliance

Post-Conflict Northern Ireland

by Peter Shirlow

April 2013:  This short report relates to the present situation in Northern Ireland some 15 years after the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. It has two parts. The first reflects upon a 6 year study in which we have surveyed families in Belfast’s most segregated communities. This paints a picture of on-going post-settlement issues and difficulties. The second part based upon Life and Times statistics and other data paints a picture of both positive and negative change. In sum, the peace process appears to be moving at two speeds in which some communities remain caught in a perpetual cycle of poverty, sectarian asperity and intra-community devotion whilst others are shifting into less antagonistic positions. These shifts are paralleled by a decline in voting and political participation.

The Northern Ireland Study

This 5 year project is led by Mark Cummings (University of Notre Dame) and is funded by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. Other investigators and staff include Marcie Goeke-Morey, Ph.D., Catholic University of America; Pete Shirlow, Ph.D., Queen's University-Belfast; Christine Merrilees, Ph.D., and Laura Taylor, M.A., University of Notre Dame.

The Northern Ireland Project is a longitudinal study of relations between political violence and the well-being of children living in Belfast. Utilizing an ecological, process-oriented model, the study seeks to better understand the pathways between political and sectarian violence and ordinary crime, family functioning, and adolescents' adjustment. Further details of the project and publications relating to it are available at http://www3.nd.edu/~candk/ireland.htm. This is a timely and important topic and has produced a fascinating understanding of ‘post-conflict; realities in Northern Ireland. So far the project has determined;

1. Despite the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998, segregation and sectarian tension continue to be a lived experience for many people living in  areas that bore the brunt of conflict;
2. Remaining violence has wide-ranging repercussions on youth and families living in segregated communities, including mental health problems and behavior problems for children and adolescents;
3. For example, both sectarian community violence and non-sectarian crime and violence are significant issues for youth in these communities;
4. Youths’ sense of security and safety about their communities is weakened by continued exposure to sectarian acts. A related decreased sense of security increases mental health problems and aggression levels;
5. Despite widespread efforts to get youth engaged in cross-community projects, few youth within this study are positively engaging in their communities;
6. Recorded sectarian crime is falling but the perception of it is rising. The perception of sectarian crimes can be 20 to 30 times higher than what is recorded;
7. The perception of sectarian violence is the most significant predictor for both communities of a negative attitude to policing;

Other Issues

1. According to Professor Tomlinson at Queen’s University Belfast there has been a near doubling of the suicide rate since 1998 compared to decline in GB and Republic of Ireland. This he relates to persons who lived during the conflict;  (for more information see http://sspswqub.wordpress.com/2012/07/24/children-of-the-troubles-more-prone-to-suicide/);
2. Combatants are 4-5 times more likely to be alcohol dependent and engaged in hazardous drinking and 5-6 times more likely to be on anti-depressants/tranquilizers. NI average use of anti-depressants/tranquilizers 2.5/3 times higher than GB; (for more information see http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/InstituteofCriminologyandCriminalJustice/Publications/worddocs/Filetoupload,226499,en.pdf);
3. 26% of Catholics live in poverty compared to 18% of Protestants.
4. High levels of worklessness remain with some 31 per cent of the working-age population not in paid work. This is higher than any GB region and 6 per cent higher than the GB average. In relation to this are high rates of disability and limiting long-term illness, especially mental ill-health. Low wages: the median wage for men working full-time is 85 percent of that for British men. Poor-quality part-time jobs and obstacles to mothers who wish to work; (for more on poverty in Northern Ireland see http://www.niapn.org/)
5. The increase in number of interfaced walls since the Agreement as with the flags protest is a sign of remaining disquiet. The main threat at present are Republican ‘Dissidents’, but a more aggressive loyalism is starting to re-appear. This will not lead to the ‘destabilizing past’ but it does aid the reproduction of sectarianism and atavistic attitudes. This rise in dissent has been shown through violence and the Flags Protest;

However, there are also important trends that are taking place that are largely ignored but which are vital to understanding how some sections of society are changing.

1. 10. The bedding down of devolution seems to have drawn some Catholic respondents according to the Life and Times Survey away from a desire for Irish unification. In 1998, 49 per cent of Catholics wished for a reunited Ireland compared to 33 per cent in 2010;
2. 11. Within the Life and Times Survey between 1999 and 2010 the share who considered themselves to be Northern Irish rose from 19 per cent to 28 per cent, with a significant decline in Protestants and Catholics who considered themselves to be British (-13 per cent) or Irish (-10 per cent);
3. 12. The Life and Times Survey has also shown that two-thirds of those aged 18-24 now consider themselves to be neither unionist nor nationalist/republican;
4. 13. In parallel to these identity shifts turnout in Northern Ireland Assembly elections between 1998 and 2011 fell from 70 per cent to 54.5 per cent.
5. 14. There are probably many reasons why the share of the electorate that votes has declined. One possible reason has been the failure to deliver on key policies linked to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement that include insufficient progress regarding the Single Equality Bill, A Shared Future, Dealing with the Past, Parades and a  Bill of Rights.
6. 15. In 2011 the Northern Ireland Assembly passed 29 pieces of legislation. Since then it has passed 8 pieces of legislation. This slow process of legislative change aids a sense of futility concerning the capacity of the Executive.

Conclusion

It would appear that positive changes such as the growth in mixed marriages and a desire to engage socially between the two main communities is being driven by wider social processes that are not tied to the rhetoric of the past. However, there are few signs that this section of society, which appears to be growing, is linked significantly into the political dispensation that exists. This is problematic given that their tolerance and mutual respect could be channeled into significant political re-alignment. There is another section that is more rooted in cultural claims and mono-cultural depictions of identity. There are links between this latter group and poverty although few policies link poverty and sectarian attitudes.

Northern Ireland is not simply fractured between the ‘Green and Orange’ but also by emerging divisions between those whose identities are driven by either British and Irish nationalism and those who wish to live more post-nationalist lifestyles. If the latter group does not vote then we have an additional and growing form of political alienation emerging in Northern Ireland. There are a series of challenges within Northern Ireland that remain but theseneed to be debated in a fresh and transparent manner. This two speed peace process between established and alternative identities requires a more broadly defined post-conflict politics in which resource competition is replaced by more inclusive and wide ranging forms of citizenship.